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A Survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act
3 HE RECENT EXPANSION OF THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
to facilitate the functioning of the various levels of governmental
operations has created a correspondingly complex morass of pro-
cedural law.1 Administrative procedure being the creation of ad-
ministrative law, a definition of the latter is necessary for an
understanding of the former. This area of law has been demarcated
by "the provisions of statutes conferring rule making and adjudica-
tory powers upon organizations in government outside the judicial
branch and orders entered by these agencies pursuant to such
powers."' It should be noted, however, that this definition, like
other brief definitions of broad areas of law, is not totally complete
or absolutely accurate. It will be satisfactory for the purpose of
forming a basis of understanding for the purpose of this discussion.
In Ohio, the General Assembly has granted a variety of agencies
the authority to create and enforce rules and regulations in order
to carry out their statutorily allocated responsibilities.3 Each agency
is established by a separate set of statutes which sets forth not only
the basic deontological parameters of the agency, but also the pro-
cedural methods by which these goals would be attained. In 1941,
the General Assembly of Ohio passed Amended Bill 324, creating
the Administrative Law Commission for the purposes of studying
the current exigencies of the state's administrative law and to re-
port their findings in the form of a proposed procedural code. 4 As a
result of its recommendation, the General Assembly enacted the
Ohio Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter referred to as
the A.P.A.) in 1943. 5 This act originally applied to the activities of
those agencies accorded a licensing authority, but in 1945 an amend-
ment was enacted extending the A.P.A. to other agencies as de-
fined in the current Ohio Revised Code §119.01.6 There are currently
some eighty agencies or activities encompassed by this act.7
I Rosenberg v. Cleveland Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 24 Ohio Misc. 10, 15, 263 N.E.2d 325,
329 (C.P. 1970); 1 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §5 (1953).
2 A. Reilly, Jr., Background of the Administrative Procedure Act, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONFERENCE 1.02 (Ohio Legal
Center Institute 1965).
'1 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §5 (1953).
4 119 Laws of Ohio 388 (Page 1941).
'Ohio Gen. Code §§154-61 to 154-73; 120 Laws of Ohio 358 (Page 1944).
'Ohio Gen. Code §§154-61 to 154-73, as amended, (1943); 121 Laws of Ohio 578 (Page
1946).
7Foe a listing of agencies subject to the Ohio A.P.A. sea S. N. Melvin, Appeals to Court
Under the AdministratiV Procedure Act, RFPFRENCE MANUAL FOR CONUIlNUING LEGAL
EDUCATION ADMINISTRATIVE LAw CONFERENCE 4.09, Appendix A (Ohio Legal Center
Institute 1965).
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Presently, there are three means by which an agency may be
brought under the auspices of the A.P.A.'
1) Where the statute which brings the agency into being
and/or which grants it its authority specifically designates
that the agency is so subject; or
2) Any official, board, or commission possessing the power
to promulgate rules or make adjudications in specified de-
partments and commissions identified in §119.01 (A) of the
Ohio Revised Code; or
3) Any licensing function of any administrative or execu-
tive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commis-
sion of government of the state having the authority or
responsibility to issue, suspend, revoke, or cancel licenses.
The A.P.A. does, however, exclude certain agencies and specific
functions of others which otherwise would be encompassed by the
act. Most predominant among these exclusions named are the Ohio
Public Utilities Commission, the Bureau of Workmen's Compensa-
tion of the Ohio Industrial Commission, and certain acts of the
Bureau of Employment Services (formerly the Bureau of Unem-
ployment) .1" The procedures which are used in the action of these
agencies are delineated by separate statutes, usually in the code sec-
tions creating and empowering them.1
Each agency is vested with its particular power and collateral
responsibilities by specific legislations, but the A.P.A. is a general
code, designating the extreme procedural limits of the legislative
grant of authority to these boards. 2 Because administrative law has
its origins in legislation, these powers are strictly confined to con-
form with that legislation. 3
In particular the A.P.A. covers three primary functions of ad-
ministrative agencies: promulgation of rules and regulations, licens-
ing, and adjudication. The remainder of the act is involved with
adjuncts of the activities, e.g. hearings, notice, records, and
judicial review.
s Ohio Rev. Code §119.01 (A) (Page 1969); In re Martins Ferry Metro. Housing Authority,
2 Ohio App. 2d 237, 240, 207 N.E.2d 672, 674 (1965).
9 Id.
"Ohio Rev. Code §119.01 (Page 1969).
'1 For an example of this type of procedural action, see Ohio Rev. Code §4111.01 et seq.
(Page 1969), dealing with the Director of Industrial Relations; and for an example of its
application see Acme Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. v. Mahoney, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 147,
189 N.E.2d 915 (C.P. Franklin County 1963).
I2 1 Ohio Jur.2d, Administratie Law and Prvcedurv §§90-94 (1953).
'" Rosenberg v. Cleveland Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 24 Ohio Misc. 10, 263 N.E.2d 325 (C.P.
1970); Akron and Barberton Belt Rd. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 316, 319,
135 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1956).
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Rule Making
The rules of a particular agency are the basis for all actions
which it takes that are of legal interest. These rules fall within two
categories defined by their application. The first group, those regula-
tions pertaining to internal management and administration, is not
within the purview of the A.P.A.14 The second group is comprised
of those regulations which have the force and effect of law, and it
is mandatory that their creation comply with all the statutory pro-
cedural provisions. Failure to do so will invalidate any rule thus
adopted, amended, or rescinded.12 The action of an agency in chang-
ing its rules has been defined as a quasi-legislative authority, as
opposed to its quasi-judicial authority in adjudicatory decisions. s
The quasi-legislative action occurs whenever an agency de-
termines a need to adopt, amend, or rescind a rule or regulation;
the procedure outlined in the Ohio Revised Code §119.03 is directly
applicable in these situations.
Whenever a rule change is proposed, the initial requirement of
the A.P.A. is that the agency must give reasonable public notice of
the proposed change and establish a hearing date at least thirty
days following publication of the notice.16 The manner and form of
the notice is left to the discretion of the individual agency, but it
must be reasonable 7 and adequate.1 8 Each agency must adopt a reg-
ulation standardizing its method of publishing notice." It should be
noted that in order to fulfill the reasonableness requirement the
notice must contain a statement of the agency's intent,20 and either
a synopsis of the proposed rule change or a statement of the subject
matter of the change, 21 as well as the date, time, and place of the
hearing." While the agency may, if it so desires, give additional
notice (e.g. to individuals and/or businesses directly affected by the
new rule), they are under no obligation to do so, nor is the neces-
sity for a standard rule extended to this extraordinary notification
when and if, it is exercised.
4 Ohio Rev. Code §119.01(C) (Page 1969); Lloyd v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ohio App.
467, 200 N.,2d 705 (1964).
"Ohio Rev. Code §119.02 (Page 1969); In re Rules and Regulations of Div. of Social
Admin., 118 Ohio App. 407, 412, 195 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1963).
16Ohio Rev. Code §119.03 (A) (Page 1969).
17 Id.
18 Tripodi v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 21 Ohio App.2d 110, 255 N.E.2d 294 (1970).
19Ohio Rev. Code §119.03(A) (3) (Page 1969); In re Rules and Regulations of Div. of
Social Admin,, 118 Ohio App. 407, 409, 195 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1963).
20Ohio Rev. Code §119.03(A) (1) (Page 1969).
Ohio Rev. Code §119.03(A) (2) (Page 1969).
"Ohio Rev. Code §119.03(A) (3) (Page 1969).
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The statement of the proposed rule change in the notice must
state the new rule in its final, adopted form. There is no require-
ment that each revision of the proposed rule be published. 23
Once notice has been given as required, the agency must hold
a public hearing as scheduled 4 These hearings are to be held ac-
cording to the Ohio Revised Code §119.03 which instructs the agency
to allow "any person affected by the proposed change" to appear,
be heard, examine witnesses and offer evidence "tending to show
that said proposed rule, amendment, or rescission, if adopted or
effectuated, will be unreasonable or unlawful." (Emphasis added).
A strict interpretation of this section indicates that concerned in-
dividuals may appear only if they are against the proposed rule
change. Also the agency is solely responsible for gathering evidence
to document the reasonableness and lawfulness of the proposal.
Other requirements of the hearings are that the agency, at its
own expense, must make a record of the testimony, evidence, and
admissibility rulings; that the agency shall have the right, but not
the duty, to administer oaths; and that the agency shall pass on the
admissibility of evidence. When the agency rules that a specific
piece of offered evidence is inadmissible, any affected person may
make an objection, and upon the offeror's proferring of the evidence,
such proffer will be made a part of the official record. 25
Section 119.03 also requires that where a rule is amended, the
change will be accomplished by enacting the entire new rule, by
including the amended portion, and by repealing the old rule. The
original case law on this point held that the old rule had to be
specifically repealed by the agency and that if it were not, the
attempted institution of the new rule would be a nullity.2 This par-
ticular technicality has been removed by the rationalization that
the effectuation of the new rule repeals its predecessor automatically
as long as the necessary statutory procedural rules are followed.
27
Subsequent to the adoption of the rule by the agency, several
requirements must be met. The A.P.A. provides that:
1) a certified copy of the rule must be filed with the secre-
tary of state ;28
23Ohio State Fed'n. of Licensed Nursing Homes v. Public Health Council, 113 Ohio App.
113, 116, 117, 172 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1961), aff'd 172 Ohio St. 227, 174 N.E,2d 251
(1961).
2Ohio Rev. Code §119.03 (C) (Page 1969).
25Id.
"Golubski v. Board of Embalmers, 114 Ohio App. 111, 180 N.E.2d 861 (1961).
27 jamison Plumbing and Heating Co. v. kose, 14 Ohio App.2d 47, 236 NE_2d 561 (1967),
overruling Golubski v. Board of Embalmers, 114 Ohio App. 111, 180 N.E.2d 861 (1961).
"
5Ohio Rev. Code §119.04 (Page 1969).
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2) the effective date of the rule shall be set not less than 10
days after filing; 2"
3) the agency will make a reasonable attempt to inform those
affected and will have copies of the rule available for dis-
tribution upon request.3 0
Adjudication Proceedings
The mere passage and enactment of rules would be an abstract
motion were the agency not granted a corresponding authority to
enforce those rules. This enforcement is accomplished by adjudica-
tion proceedings through which the agencies act in a quasi-judicial
manner. Each agency employs the existing applicable law avail-
able in any particular case.32 Where using an adjudicatory process
to enforce an order, the agency may act only to the extent of its
statutorily granted authority.3 Thus, these proceedings are guided
by the dual directives of the granting authority and of the A.P.A.
as are all the proceedings of the agencies.34
Procedures involved in quasi-legislative activities are compara-
tively standardized, but adjudication procedures may become much
more complicated by the very nature of the proceeding involved.
The adjudicatory activities of the agencies are described as being
quasi-judicial s and as such may become at least as diverse and
involved as in any court proceeding.
There are a variety of situations in which an agency may issue
an adjudication order. One of these situations is where the agency
exercises its power to suspend licenses for a violation of either
agency regulation or law.
6
Ordinarily a hearing must be held prior to the issuance of an
adjudicatory order by the agency. However, there are several ex-
ceptions to this rule. These situations arise when an agency is
statutorily required to revoke a license as a result of a court order;
when a suspension is allowed by a statute expressly negating the
2Ohio Rev. Code §119.03(D) (Page 1969).
30 Ohio Rev. Code §119.03 (F) (Page 1969).
31 1 Ohio Jur.2d, Admninistrative Law and Procedure §88 (1953).
32 
M. S. CULP, CASES AND MATERIAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 311
(1966).
"
3State ex rel Kahler-Ellis Co. v. Cline, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 305, 125 NY.2d 222 (C.P. Lucas
County 1954).
4Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Foust, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 482, 117 N.E2d 725 (C.P. Franklin
County 1954); 1 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §86 (1953).
351 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §§37-39; see also Handler v. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 14 Ohio Misc. 9, 233 N.E.2d 147 (C.P. 1967); compare S_ S. Kresge
Co. v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 405, 166 N.E.2d 139 (1960).
36Ohio Rev. Code §119.061 (Page 1969); Ohio Rev. Code §119.07 (Page 1969).
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hearing requirement; or when an appeal to a higher level agency
exists, as long as a hearing is available at that level.3' In some in-
stances there is an absence of an automatic hearing requirement.M
When there has been a judicial determination that a licensee may
successfully demand a hearing upon the suspension. 9 In these cir-
cumstances the suspension takes effect upon issuance and remains
in effect during the subsequent hearing.
As previously observed, a hearing must be held prior to the
issuance of most adjudicatory orders. The A.P.A. requirements in
these instances demand that the agency notify the licensee of his
opportunity to request a hearing, stating his right to legal counsel
and profferment of evidence, and the charge against him.4" The
Ohio Revised Code, §119.07, states that "the notice shall be given
by registered mail, return receipt requested ..... " The courts look
upon this statutory requirement as a method of insuring that ade-
quate notice has been given the licensee. The adequacy of the notice
is the primary consideration, rather than precise compliance.
41
With this theory as a basic premise the courts treat a signed, re-
turned receipt as prim facie evidence of adequate notice, but the
licensee may present evidence in rebuttal of this fact.42 On the other
hand, when the licensee arrives at the hearing prepared to litigate
the subject matter, but he has not been given notice by the ap-
proved method, it may be assumed that he has waived the notice
requirement.43
The hearing must be originally set at not less than seven but
not more than fifteen days after the party's request has been made,
but may be postponed or continued upon the motion of any affected
party or of the agency." Section 119.07 of the Ohio Revised Code
does not establish the maximum time allowed for delays. However,
the courts have determined that an unexplained and unreasonable
delay deprives the affected party of due process. 4 These decisions
37Ohio Rev. Code §119.06 (Page 1969).
38SlalI v- Department of Liquor Control, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 134, 135, 134 N.E.2d 390, 391
(Ct. App. 1953).
39Toledo v. Bernoir, 18 Ohio St.2d 94, 98, 247 N.E.2d 740, 744 (1969) (registrar of motor
vehicles may suspend a driver's license under Ohio Rev. Code §119.06 (B), but must afford
a hearing upon the driver's request under Ohio Rev. Code §4509.04).
40Ohio Rev. Code §119.07 (Page 1969).
4'Tripodi v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 21 Ohio App.2d 110, 255 N.E.2d 294 (1970).
42 J[,
43 Meyer v. Board of Liquor Control Comm'n, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 407, 410, 119 N.E.2d 156, 158
(C.P. Franklin County 1954).
"4Ohio Rev. Code §119.09 (Page 1969).
45m re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969); sea Cunning-
ham v. Jerry Spears Co., 119 Ohio App. 169, 197 N.E.2d 810 (1963); State ex rel.
Columbus Gas and Fuel Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 122 Ohio St. 473, 172 N.E. 284(1930).
1073]
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have established that the agency must provide a timely and ex-
peditious hearing but that the reasonableness of the delay is deter-
mined by the particular facts of each case.46 In some instances
statutes other than Chapter 119 state a particular period when a
specific agency must hold the hearing. In these situations this man-
datory duty may successfully be avoided by the agency only if it
can show that compliance would inevitably produce a conflict with
the rights of a party other than those of the party involved and
that this third party's rights are the superior of the two."
Once the date, time, and place of the hearing have been deter-
mined and notice has been issued, the agency is empowered to
require the attendance of witnesses and the production of docu-
ments, papers, records, and books it feels are necessary for a fair
hearing. This is accomplished through the use of a subpoena or a
subpoena daces tecum.'
At the beginning of the hearing, the agency must determine
whether or not a stenographic record is required. In most instances
such a record is required and must contain all the evidence and
testimony presented at the hearing. 49 There is no record required
when there will be no appeal to a court from the decision of the
agency. 0 Yet, because any person adversely affected by the deci-
sion may appeal under the provisions of the A.P.A.,51 a stenographic
record is a pragmatic necessity at most hearings. sA The importance
of the record, at least from the agency's viewpoint cannot be over-
emphasized. If there should be an appeal from the ruling of the
agency, the courts will admit only the recorded evidence and testi-
mony as proof of the reasonableness and lawfulness of the agency's
decision. 3 When a record has not been made 4 or when it is incom-
plete to the extent of failing to show sufficient justification,5' the
board's ruling will not stand.
46 Id,
47 State ex ref. Hannan v. DeCourcy, 18 Ohio St.2d 73, 77, 78, 247 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1969).
AOhio Rev. Code §119.09 (Page 1969).
"9Id.
50 Id.
51 Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 (Page 1969).
52 The most obvious case where a record need not be made is where the licensee pleads guilty
to the violation, but even here there may be an appeal on procedural grounds.
1 Doelker v. Accountancy Bd., 12 Ohio St.2d 76, 80, 232 N.E.2d 407, 410 (1967); Accaro
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 7 Ohio St.2d 32, 218 N.E.2d 179 (1966).
54 Fahienbruck v. State Bd. of Landscape Architect Examiners, 13 Ohio Misc. 39, 230 N.E.2d
691 (C.P. 1967); American Legion, Post 96 v. Board of Liquor Control, 21 Ohio Op.2d
320, 322, 187 N.E.2d 195, 196 (C.P. 1962); Matash v. Dept. of Insurance, 117 Ohio St.
55, 202 N.E.2d 305 (1964).
11 Minarik v. Board of Review, Dep't of State Personnel, 118 Ohio App. 71, 193 N.E.2d 396
(1962).
[Vol. 22:320
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The agency is empowered to call witnesses to testify under
oath.5 6 The general rules of cross-examination are used as a guide
for the method of interrogating these witnesses. 5'
One of the most sensitive areas of discretion in which the
agency becomes involved is in the determination of the admissibility
of evidence. The Ohio Revised Code §119.09 grants the authority to the
agencies to make these determinations in each hearing. 8 The legis-
lature, of course, has the authority to grant the right to prescribe
rules of evidence to the agencies. 59 This power to enact rules of
evidence is limited in that provision must be made for an equitable
forum"0 which will not deprive the subject party of his right to due
process.1 In ruling on admissibility, the agency is not required to
conform to the strict criteria of evidentiary rules applicable to a
court of law because the agencies are only quasi-judicial, 2 This is
not to state that this atmosphere of informality may be allowed to
become so extreme as to be lax, because the underlying tenet of
fairness must remain superior to the practical necessity of an effi-
cient mechanical process. 3
These limits give the agency a great deal of latitude in its
evidentiary rules but still limit them from grossly unfair rulings.
They may not admit as evidence what clearly is not evidence" or,
conversely, exclude what clearly has evidentiary merit.5 The A.P.A.
does very little to solidify the guidelines within which the evi-
dentiary rules are to be established, but it must be remembered that
the basis of a hearing is fairness and reasonableness. 6 Thus, it has
been suggested that the specific rules of evidence established should
-Ohio Rev. Code § 119.09 (Page 1969).
57 1 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedvne §119 (1953).
8Lakis v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 Ohio App. 163, 201 N.E.2d 605 (1963), appeal
dismisied, 177 Ohio St. 80, 202 N.E.2d 309 (1964).
59 Ohio Power Co. v. Diller, 18 Ohio App.2d 167, 247 N.E.2d 774 (1969).
'
t iz re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.fl.2d 262 (1969).
1 Department of Liquor Control v. Santucci, 17 Ohio St.2d 69, 72, 73, 246 N.E.2d 549, 551
(1969).
12 In re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969); Provident Sav-
ings Bank and Trust Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 175, 178 (C.P. Hamilton County
1931).
6"Fugate v. Columbus, 4 Ohio App.2d 147, 211 N.E.2d 885 (1963).
Iu re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969); General Motors
Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110 N.E.2d 12 (1952); Eastern Ohio Distrib. Co.
v. Board of Liquor Control, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 188, 98 N E2d 330 (Ct. App. 1950).
5 5Ohio Real Estate Conrn'n v. Cohen, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 137, 145-46, 187 N.E.2d 641, 645-46
(CP Muskingum Co. 1962); Fugate v. Columbus, 4 Ohio App.2d 147, 152-54, 211
N.E.2d 885, 889 (1963).
"1 General Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110 N.E.2d 12 (1952); 1 Ohio Jur.2d,
Administrative Law and Procedure §110 (1969).
1973]
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parallel those used by a court of law in civil proceedings rather
than criminal.67 These guidelines are generally applicable, but there
are instances when specific agencies are statutorily limited1a or im-
mune to these guidelines; thus, the procedure established for in-
dividual agencies must be closely examined prior to hearings before
them. A suggested goal for the establishment of more uniform and
reasonable evidentiary guidelines has been suggested; replacing
rules with discretion, admitting all evidence that seems to the pre-
siding officer to be relevant and useful, and relying upon the kind
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely
upon in serious affairs."
Whenever the agency makes an unfavorable ruling upon offered
evidence, the offeror may object. Upon a continued unfavorable rul-
ing, the evidence may be proffered, and such proffer shall be made
a part of the official record of the hearing.71 Because the record is
the only presentation of the hearing that an agency may make to
an appellate court, it is obvious that any disputes in the evidence
will be included in the record.
The form of the evidence presented is also less restrictive than
in regular judicial proceedings. An agency may use any evidence
which is presented to, and accepted by it, regardless of its form or
manner of presentation.2 In any individual situation, determination
of the proper form, as in the case of acceptable substance, is left
largely to the discretion of the board holding the hearing."3 Deposi-
tions, for example, may be taken by the agency, but the language
of the A.P.A. indicates that a licensee or other affected party may
enter depositions only within the rules for other evidence, that is,
at the reasonable discretion of the hearing board.' 4 This discretion
may be restricted by the particular agency statute which might
give an absolute right or prohibition as to such depositions.
5
67Matteo v. Department of Liquor Control, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 130 N.E.2d 351 (Ct App.
1955); State ex eel Mayers v. Gray, 114 Ohio St. 270, 151 N.E. 125 (1926).
68 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §4715.37 (Page 1969) (State Dental Board) arid Ohio Rev. Code
§§4123.515 4123.519 (Page 1969) (Ohio Industrial Commission).
0? See Ohio Rev. Code §4141.28 (J) (Supp. 1972) (Board of Review of the Bureau of Unem.
ployment Compensation) and Ohio Rev. Code §4123.515 (Bureau of Workmen's Com-
pensation), which specifically make the common law and statutory rule of evidence un-
enforceable in hearings before these boards.
tiK. C. DAVIS, ADMINSTRAIUVE LAW TEXT 271 (3rd ed. 1972).
71 Ohio Rev. Code §119.09 (Page 1969).
" Reinhart v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Ohio St. 159, 28 N.E.2d 498 (1940).
73Id.
T Ohio Rev. Code §119.09 (Page 1969).
75 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §4903.06 (Page 1969).
[Vol. 22:320
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A point of evidence which is not statutorily defined is the extent
to which the agency may use its own expertise or official knowledge
in arriving at a determination. Because an administrative hearing
lacks the elements of a true adversary situation, the agency may
not use its expertise or official knowledge as the sole basis for its
decision, although, from a pragmatic viewpoint, the members of
the hearing board will be affected by their cognizance of the subject
matter.'
7
In most agency adjudicatory hearings, the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting the affirmative viewpoint, 8 as is the
general rule in regular judicial proceedings."
The Ohio A.P.A. provides for an additional type of adjudicatory
procedure other than the usual hearing. Any agency operating under
Chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised Code may appoint a referee or
examiner to conduct the hearing.80 The qualifications of this indi-
vidual are left to the discretion of the agency, with the only restric-
tion being the admission of the referee or examiner to the practice
of law in the State of Ohio." This referee files a written report of
his findings of fact, his conclusions of law, and his recommendations
as to the action to be taken by the agency. Within five days after
the filing of this report with the agency, a copy will be sent to the
party or his attorney, who will then file his objections to the report.
The agency, upon consideration of both the referee's report and the
objections thereto, may approve, modify, or disapprove the recom-
mendations. An order of an agency determined in this manner has
the same weight and authority as if determined by a full agency
hearing.02
In both a full board and referee hearing, there are imposed
requirements that the agency must adhere to in arriving at its de-
cisions through proper consideration of the evidence.01 The adjudi-
catory order must be based on evidence which is reliable, probative,
78Pollack and leach, A Re-Appraisal of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act, 11 OHIO
STATE L.J. 69,84 (1950).
71 Ohio Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure §104 (1953).
78 General Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110 N.E.2d 12 (1952); Canton Mal-
leable Iron Co. v. Green, 75 Ohio App. 526, 62 N.E.2d 756 (1944).
7? C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §337 (2d ed.
1972)
80 Ohio Rev. Code §119.09 (Page 1969).
81 Jd
82 1d.
3 Ohio Rev. Code §119,12 (Page 1969).
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and substantial 4 The order must also be lawful and reasonable 6
as determined by the powers conferred upon the agency by the Ohio
Constitution and statutes which created the agency or vested such
power in it. 7
Once a determination has been made, it enters the decision in
its journal and serves, by registered mail, a certified copy of the
order to the person or persons affected, as well as to the attorney of
record.88 When the order is adverse to the party, the agency also will
send instructions as to the time and method by which an appeal
may be made.9
Appeals
There are two appeals sections of the A.P.A. The first, the Ohio
Revised Code 1I9.11, deals with appeals from rules adopted,
amended, or rescinded by an agency under the Ohio Revised Code
§119.03. The second concerns appeals from adjudicatory rulings.
Because these appeals have their basis in statutory authority, sec-
tions 119.11 and 119.12 must be strictly complied with by the courts."
This can raise a number of problems because the courts must at the
same time expect a certain lack of precision from the quasi-courts
of the agencies. 1
Appeals From Agency Rules
The Ohio Revised Code, §119.11 states in part that:
Any person adversely affected by an order of an agency
[determined under authority of the Ohio Rev. Code §119.03]
.. may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin
County on the grounds that said agency failed to comply
with the law in adopting, amending, rescinding, publishing,
or distributing said rule, or that the rule as adopted or
amended by the agency is unreasonable or unlawful or that
the rescission of the rule was unreasonable or unlawful.
Mid; In re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 162, 250 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1969).
"sOhio Rev. Code, §119.12 (Page 1969); Evans v. Board of Liquor Control, 112 Ohio
App. 264, 172 N.E.2d 336 (1960).
"Woody's Market, Inc. v. Board of Bldg. Appeals, Dep't of Indust. Relations, 58 Ohio Op.2d
509, 283 N.E.2d 459 (C.P. 1972); General Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110
N.E.2d 12 (1952).
071o re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 162, 163, 250 N.E.2d 262, 267, 268
(1969); State ex rel. Mayers v. Gray, 114 Ohio St. 270, 275, 151 N.E. 125, 126 (1926);
Eastern Ohio Distrib. Co. v. Board of Liquor Control, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 188, 189, 190, 98
N.E.2d 350, 351 (Ct. App. 1950).
"Ohio Rev. Code §119.09 (1969).
9 id.
"Detelich v. Department of Liquor Control, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 195, 107 N.E.2d 415 (Ct. App.
1950).
General Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110 N.E.2d 12 (1952); Canton Mal-
leable Iron Co. v. Green, 75 Ohio App. 526, 62 N.F.2d 756 (1944).
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Obviously this statute offers a great deal of latitude for argumen-
tative grounds upon which an appeal can be based. However, before
the court will hear an appeal, the affected person must insure that
he has exhausted all his available administrative remedies.' 2 Failure
to exhaust these remedies bars the appeal from the courts,'3 except
when an appellant can show evidence that attempts at such admin-
istrative appeals would be futile.' 4 The logic behind this requirement
is twofold. First, the common law required that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law be strictly construed. This demands that the
A.P.A. definition of an administrative adjudication as "the deter-
mination by the highest or ultimate authority of an agency . . ." be
followed because at common law there were no administrative
agencies. Second, the precedent followed in general administrative
law has been that the courts will not interfere with agency pro-
ceedings prior to their conclusion. 5 There are exceptions to this
general rule against court interference. When the agency has clearly
exceeded its authority" or, in the consociated circumstance, when
there is a determination that the agency has no authority to act in
any respect, 7 the courts may take what otherwise would be pre-
mature action and act on an injured party's action.
A quasi-legislative administrative agency has been defined as
an agency with the power to enact rules and regulations which
carry the weight and authority of law.98 These rules are intended
to, and do, concern a segment of the population in general where
their effect upon this segment is of a standard."9
When this quasi-legislative authority is exercised by the enact-
ment of rules and regulations, there is no right of judicial review
under the Ohio Revised Code §119.11.100 The theory here is that the
agency, when acting within its statutory authority, has been dele-
gated the legislative power of the General Assembly.' Because the
92 State x rel. Lieux v. Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412, 96 N.E.2d 414 (1951).
93 Bureau of Unemployment Compensation v. Caudill, 27 Ohio Misc. 34, 35, 272 N.E.2d
204, 206 (C.P. 1971).
94 Ogletree v, McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971).
I'McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
561d; see also, In re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 250 N.E.2d 262 (1969).
17 State ex rtl. Basbuto v. Ohio Edison Co., 16 Ohio App.2d 55, 61-62, 241 N.E.2d 783, 787
(1968).
98Ohio Rev. Code §119.02 (Page 1969); In re Rules and Regulations of Division of Social
Administration, 118 Ohio App. 407, 410, 195 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1963).
"
t In re Martins Ferry Metro. Housing Authority, 2 Ohio App.2d 237, 241, 207 N.E.2d 672,
674 (1965); Bi-Metaliic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S.
441, 444 (1915); Zimmerman v. Canfield, 42 Ohio St. 463, 472 (1885).
"'t Former v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 19, 257 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970).
I" State v. Schneckengost, 30 Ohio St.2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972).
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courts cannot and will not accept moot or abstract questions or give
advisory opinions when dealing with the legislature, they will not
test administrative regulations in a vacuum.10 2 The reviewability of
a rule change occurs only when the agency applies its rules to those
under its authority;153 and only when a question arises out of the
rule's application is the validity of the regulation tested?0 ' While
this distinction may seem slight, it serves the purpose of removing
the rule from the area of strict quasi-legislative matters and places
it in an administrative context,10 5 thereby subjecting the matter to
the Ohio Revised Code §119.11.15 To proceed under this section, the
person attempting to appeal must prove his standing to question the
agency's decision. 07 This is accomplished by showing that he was a
party to the administrative hearing;1" that he is amenable to, and
controlled by, their rules; and that he was adversely affected by the
rule change, adoption, or rescission.1 09 The courts have been rather
liberal in granting standing and thus have reduced the occurrence
of an agency's decision being nonreviewable by a judicial body. 10
Once the adversely affected party has determined that he in-
tends to appeal, there are certain procedures necessary in order to
initiate the action. The party wishing to appeal a rule decision must
file a notice of appeal with the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, setting forth the grounds, within fifteen days after the rule
has been filed. The agency then has ten days to file in court a
transcript of the proceedings held with regard to that specific rule.
Within three days after receiving the record, the court will notify
12Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St.2d 155, 157, 216 N.E.2d 877, 878-79 (1966); Morgan Co.
Budget Comm'n v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 225, 226, 193 N.E.2d 146, 146
(1963).
"03 Ohio Rev. Code §119.02 (Page 1969).
104Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969); Battles v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 12 Ohio
App.2d 52, 55-56, 230 N.E.2d 662 (1967).
"'L tindblom v. Board of Tax Appeals, 151 Ohio St. 250, 85 N.E.2d 376 (1949); Zangerle v.
Evat, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
106 Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio Sr.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 500 (1968); for similar decisions
in other states see: Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Bird v. Sorenson,
16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964); Kleiber v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 718, 117 P.2d
657 (1941); cf. Remy v. Kimes, 175 Ohio St. 197, 191 N.E.2d 837 (1963) and Berg v.
Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964).
"'Columbus Green Cabs, Inc. v. Board of Review, Bureau of Unemploy. Compen., 88 Ohio
L. Aba. 107, 112, 184 N.E.2d 257, 260 (C.P. Franklin County 1961).
1"'Ohio Rev. Codc §119.01 (G) (Page 1969).
109Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969); Clermont Nat. Bank v. Edwards, 27 Ohio App.2d
91, 97, 273 N.E.2d 783, 790 (1970), citing an unreported case: Papp v. Darke County
Agricultural Society Civil No. 9402 (Ct. App. Franklin County, Dec. 2, 1969).
'0 G. B. MYERS, Rale Making and Licensing under the Administrative Proceadae Act, REFER-
ENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ADMtNISThATIVE LAw CONFER-
ENCE 2.05 (Ohio Legal Center Institute 1965).
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the appellant and the agency of the time, date, and place of the
hearing (to be set rot more than twenty days after the transcript
has been received)."'
There are two grounds for an appeal from an agency decision
on rule changes. Either the agency has failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of the A.P.A.,112 or the rule is unreason-
able and/or unlawful in its substance.1 Any variance from the
required procedure is sufficient to make the rule invalid.114 However,
a careful reading of the statute will reveal that in some instances
actual compliance is satisfied when the agency has made a "reason-
able effort" to fulfill the requirements and that actual, successful
accomplishment of the actions is not necessarily required.115
Remembering that an agency is a creature of delegated author-
ity, it is evident that it has no more authority than what has been
granted to it."' The reasonableness and lawfulness of any of its rule
changes, therefore must be considered within the framework of its
statutorily granted powers.111
There is a dispute as to the admissibility of new evidence at
the judicial level. The court of common pleas acts as an appellate
court in these instances and as such applies the appellate rules of
evidence to the action as in other error proceedings." 8 Further-
more, the Ohio Revised Code §119.11 states that the court's conclu-
sion "shall be based upon the arguments, briefs of counsel, and the
transcript . . ." It has been held, though, that at any stage of the
proceedings an affected party may attack the reasonableness or
legality of any rule. Also, the court of common pleas may accept
new evidence, provided proof is produced that this evidence was
unavailable at the hearinglt1
In this type of appeal the burden of proof is upon the adversely
affected party;125 that is, there is no burden upon the agency to
"I Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969).
112 Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969); see also, Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 99
(6th Cir. 1971).
.. Ohio Rcv. Code §119.11 (Page 1969); In re Rules and Regulations of the Div. of Social
Admin., Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 118 App. 407, 408, 195 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1963).
114 Id.
115 See, G. B. MYERS, REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 109.
16 State ex rel. Kahler-Ellis Co. v. Cline, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 305, 125 N.E.2d 222 (1954).
117 Rosenberg v. Cleveland, Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 24 Ohio Misc. 10, 263 N.E.2d 325 (C.P.
1970).
18 In re Bd. of Liquor Control's Amendments, 115 Ohio App, 243, 184 N.E.2d 767 (1961);
In re Appeal from Bd. of Liquor Control, 103 Ohio App. 517, 146 N.E.2d 309 (1957).
10In re Owner-Trainer Topper, 109 Ohio App. 289, 165 N.E.2d 19 (1959).
120Long v. Division of Watercraft, 118 Ohio App. 369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963).
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prove that the rule change as adopted was supported by the evi-
dence before it, that it was reasonable or lawful, or that it was
enacted through proper procedure. 21
The court must make a decision based on the arguments and
the evidence presented. It must be shown that the decision of the
agency was excessively unreasonable or done with a complete lack
of jurisdiction before the court will take corrective action.122 The
appellant must show that there was clearly an error because the
courts are reluctant to disturb a decision solely on the substitution
of their discretion for that of the hearing board,2
The court of common pleas has only two options in arriving at
a conclusion. It can decide that the agency fulfilled its requirements
and thus affirm the order of the agency, or it can decide that the
agency committed a fatal error and thus declare the rule change
invalid.2 4 The court of common pleas does not have the authority
to remand a case back to the agency for further proceedings, nor
may it modify in any way the adoption, rescission, or amendment
with which it was dealing.23
The decision of the court of common pleas may be appealed in
the same manner as any other decision, but if there is no appeal
taken, the court's order is final.'
Appeals From Adjudicatory Orders
The second section of the A.P.A. dealing with appeals is the
Ohio Revised Code §119.12 which is concerned with the adjudicatory
powers of the agencies. Here, only a party adversely affected by an
order of the agency, pursuant to an adjudication proceeding, may
establish standing. 2' The procedure to be followed is similar, but not
parallel, to that followed under the Ohio Revised Code §119.11. The
appealing party must file a notice to that effect, setting forth the
specific order appealed from and the grounds of the appeal, within
fifteen days of the mailing of the agency's notice of order. Upon
121 In re Bd. of Liquor Controls Amendments, 115 Ohio App. 243, 184 N.E.2d 767 (1961)
122 State v. Schreckengost, 30 Ohio St.2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972).
123 Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839 (C.P.
1968); Alliance v. Joyce, 49 Ohio St. 7, 30 N.E. 270 (1392).
124 Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969).
'25 Rosenberg v. Cleveland Bd. of Bldg. Standards 24 Ohio Misc. 10, 263 N.E.2d 325 (C.P.
1970); Ruggiero v. Brooklyn Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 32 Ohio Op.2d 346, 197 N.E.2d 828
(Ct App- 1964).
"'Ohio Rev. Code §119.11 (Page 1969).
27Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 (Page 1969).
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receipt of the appeal notice, the court may determine whether the
agency order will create a hardship upon the affected party and, at
its discretion, may suspend this order pending the outcome of its
hearing."'
Within twenty days after receipt of notification of appeal, the
agency must prepare and certify a complete record of the proceed-
ings in the case.129 (One ten-day continuance may be granted.) Once
again, the record is the only evidence which the agency is allowed
to use unless otherwise permitted by statute.13' In cases where evi-
dence is not available at the hearing, the court may allow a request
for its admission.131
Because proceedings under Chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised
Code are given preference over all other civil cases there is usually
little delay even though there is not a specific time in which the
case must be heard.32
There are a variety of aspects which the court must examine
in this type of appeal. The initial point to which attention must be
given is the certified record of the administrative hearing required
from the agency. When no record is made at the hearing, the court
must reverse the agency's order.133 If no record is submitted, it
will be assumed that there was none. When a certified record is
submitted, it still must be complete, and the courts have been very
strict in their interpretation of this requirement. Cases in which
the agency has failed to directly state that the record is complete,M
in which the record did not indicate the final order of the agency,
135
in which the record did not include an official certification but only
a signature, m or in which the record lacked the instructions for
appeal,131 all have been considered sufficient bases to support the
court's overturning of the agency order.
1 0I d .
30 Id; Doelker v. State of Ohio, Accountancy Bd. of Ohio, 12 Ohio St.2d 76, 232 N.E.2d 407
(1967); Arcaro Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 7 Ohio St.2d 32, 218 N.E.2d 179
(1966).
131 Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 (Page 1969).
132 Id.
131d; Fahrenbruck v. State Bd. of Landscape Architect Examiners, 13 Ohio Misc. 39, 230
NE.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1967); Stephan v. State Veterinary Medical Bd., 113 Ohio App. 538,
173 N.E.2d 389 (1960); American Legion Post 96 v. Board of Liquor Control, 116 Ohio
App. 173. 187 N.E.2d 194 (C.P. 1962); Matash v. Ohio, Dep't of Insurance, 177 Ohio St.
55, 202 N.E.2d 305 (1964).
"m Board of Real Estate Examiners v. Peth, 4 Ohio App.2d 413, 213 N.E.2d 188 (1964).
"13 ld.
"1d; Brockmeyer v. Ohio Real Estate Commission, 5 Ohio App.2d 161, 214 N.E.2d 265
(1966).
1U3d; cf. Starr v. Young, Adm'r, 172 Ohio St.2d 317, 175 N.E.2d 514 (1961); and Parker v.
Young, Adm'r, 172 Ohio St. 464, 178 N.E.2d 798 (1961).
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When the agency does provide a correct, complete, and certified
record, the court may determine its opinion based on the agency's
decision. The primary principle underlying this type of case is no
different from that of any other appeal in that the court is attempt-
ing to ascertain whether the appellant's rights have been observed
and protected and whether the agency decision has been fairly
determined."'
Under the Ohio Revised Code §119.09, as under §119.07, the
agency has the authority to pass on evidence admissibility. It is
required by the A.P.A. that the evidence be "reliable, probative, and
substantial" and be in accordance with the law. 139 In determining
whether or not this was accomplished, the court must look at the
entire record of the hearing. 40 When the court finds that the evidence
was sufficient, both quantitatively and qualitatively, it must affirm
the agency's decision) 4' The degree of proof required is subjective,
but the courts are hesitant to disturb the agency's exercise of dis-
cretion unless there are many unreasonable evidentiary rulings or
unjustified conclusions.'42 The court must act, however, when it finds
that the evidence does not support the decision at all 43 or when it is
in direct contradiction to the decision.'TM An admission of guilt to
an agency charge at the hearing is sufficient in and of itself to
sustain an adverse ruling, and in this instance the licensee is
estopped from any appeal.1 45 In those cases where the court finds it
must overturn the agency's decision, it has the choice of reversing,
vacating, or modifying the order.'" In those instances when an
agency's revocation or suspension of license order is suspended by
the court, such suspension supersedes the revocation as of the date
of the latter's issuance) 4 7
"3 Department of Liquor Control v. Santuci, 17 Ohio St.2d 69, 246 N.E.2d 549 (1969).
1 9 Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 (Page 1969); Lakis v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 Ohio App.
163, 201 N.E.2d 605 (1963).
140 Handler v. Department of Commerce, 14 Ohio Misc. 9, 233 N.E.2d 147 (C.P. 1967).
141 Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233, 163 N.E.2d 678 (1959).
W Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839 (C.P.
196); Alliance v. Joyce, 49 Ohio St. 7, 30 N.E. 270 (1892).
143Buekeye Lake Hotel Co. v. Beard of Liquor Control, 108 Ohio App. 417, 159 N.E.2d 632
(1958).
1'4 Ace Steel Baling, Inc. v. Porterfield, 19 Ohio St.2d 137, 249 N.E.26 892 (1969); for com-
parative decisions in other states see; Chicago B & Q R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
I Ill.2d 614, 116 N.E.2d 392 (1954); Matlock v. Industrial Cornm'n, 70 Ariz. 25, 215
P.2d 612 (1950); Public Service Comm'a v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 235 Ind. 1, 130
N.E.2d 467 (1955); Fisher School v. Assessors, 325 Mass. 529, 91 N.E.2d 657 (1950).
tatDepartment of Liquor Control v. Santucci, 17 Ohio St.2d 69, 246 N.E.2d 549 (1969); 4.
Johnson v. United States, 254 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1958); McConoaushy v. Alvis, 165 Ohio
St. 102, 133 N.E.2d 133 (1956); Click v. Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88, 186 N.E.2d 731
(1962); Yarbrough v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 287, 189 N.E.2d 136 (1963).
146Ohio Rev. Code §119.12 (Page 1969).
1"7 Lewis v. Atson, 92 Ohio App. 78, 109 N.E,2d 545 (1951).
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Prior to the existence of the A.P.A., there were other methods
used in appealing or refuting agency rulings, including actions in
mandamus, actions for declaratory judgments, or actions for dam-
ages. Today, in those agencies within the control of the A.P.A.,
these actions will not issue as a substitute for appealid because
these are extraordinary remedies and an adequate remedy is avail-
able through the procedures established by the A.P.A.
The Ohio Revised Code Chapter 119 is intended to standardize
the procedure of administrative agencies in this state, but it must
be noted that it is only one of an interrelated group of statutes. The
A.P.A. must always be used in conjunction with those statutes
pertaining to the particular agency involved in any specific instance.
It acts only as a guideline within which the activities of the con,
trolled agencies must operate.
Glenn R. Jonest
14 Kaufman v. Newburgh Heights, 26 Ohio St.2d 217, 271 N.F.2d 280 (1971) (mandamus,
declaratory judgment, action for damages); Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 450 (1857)
(mandamus); State ex rel. Stein v. Sohngen, 147 Ohio St. 359, 71 N.E.2d 483 (1947)
(mandamus); State ex -ea. Sidell v. Cole, 147 Ohio St. 203, 70 N.E.2d 451 (1946) (man-
damus); State ex rel. Ohio Assoc. of Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Insurance,
29 Ohio St.2d 188, 281 N.E.2d 9 (1972) (mandamus); State ex rel. Welsh v. Court of
Appeals of the 10th App. Dist., 171 Ohio St. 555, 173 N.E.2d 128 (1961) (prohibition).
t Law Review Candidate, second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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